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Trends in Communist Propaganda 7 Aug 74

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TRENDS


In Communist Propaganda

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WATERGATE

COMMUNIST BLOC REPORTING PICKS UP, CONTINUITY STRESSED

The pace of Moscow's reporting on Watergate has picked up in recent days, apparently reflecting a belief that events in Washington may be approaching a denouement. Increasingly frequent and prominent items on current U.S. political developments were accompanied by a Moscow radio roundtable discussion on 4 August which set forth the current situation without taking sides and explained the procedural steps involved in the impeachment process. At the same time, Moscow has seized on signs that U.S. foreign policy is likely to be little affected by any outcome of events.

Moscow's orthodox East European allies, with the exception of Hungary, have sustained a sympathetic stance toward President Nixon in their comment and reporting on the impeachment developments. Reports in Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish media on the President's statements of 5 and 6 August continued their past practice of portraying him in a generally sympathetic light; Budapest, on the other hand, underscored the President's situation as being hopeless. Bulgarian coverage has been confined to objective factual reports, while Romanian media have neither reported nor commented on the developments. Yugoslav comment has portrayed the President's removal from office as a certainty and has blamed the Watergate crisis on moral decay in the U.S. political system. Albanian comment characteristically foresees a continued "corrupt" U.S. political scene whether or not President Nixon is removed.

Peking media have continued to maintain silence on Watergate, a practice they have observed from the beginning. Pyongyang, on the other hand, has broadcast its first commentary on Watergate, interpreting it largely in terms of ideological stereotypes of party politics in the United States. Vietnamese communist media have promptly reported this week's Watergate developments, in line with their consistent practice since early 1973. A particularly detailed commentary described the crisis as the "most serious in the entire 200-year history of the United States."

USSR The TASS and Moscow radio reports of 6 August on the President's 5 August statement in turning over transcripts of conversations with former White House aide H.R. Haldeman included his concession of "a serious act of omission" which could "further damage" his case as well as his expressed conviction that the record

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nevertheless "does not justify the extreme step of impeachment and removal." TASS also reported his assessment that a House decision to impeach was a "foregone conclusion." On the 7th, TASS reported belatedly Secretary of State Kissinger's remark on leaving a 6 August "emergency meeting of the U.S. government" that on the issues of war and peace "no foreign government must have any doubts concerning the conduct of United States foreign policy" and that "U.S. foreign policy has always been and will be pursued on a bipartisan basis."

Moscow radio's roundtable discussion on the 4th included an explanation of the impeachment procedure. While it avoided coming down on either side of the impeachment issue, it noted the President's assertions that House of Representatives members who thoroughly examined the facts would conclude that the charges against him were groundless. But roundtable participants also observed a "noticeable change" in White House strategy in discarding its former "delaying tactics," and made a point of describing the support among both Republicans and Democrats for impeachment. IZVESTIYA observer Sturua's observation that the "tense political situation which has developed in Washington" was not conducive to solving domestic economic ills seemed to imply as well that the same problems were affecting Washington's foreign policy.

It has been several months since Moscow has depicted Watergate as a partisan attempt by opponents of the President's foreign policy to frustrate detente. Apparently reflecting Moscow's growing awareness of the extent of the President's vulnerability, increasing stress has been placed on evidence that support for detente was widespread in both major parties and could be found even among the President's detractors on domestic issues. An article in the 31 July SOVIET RUSSIA by TASS director and Brezhnev spokesman Leonid Zamyatin was only the most recent commentary to quote assurances by prominent U.S. politicians--in this case Senator Hugh Scott--that any President emerging from the next elections "will most likely pursue the same foreign policy that the current U.S. President is pursuing."

Despite this increasing tendency by Moscow to hedge its bets, occasional radio broadcasts to North America touching on Watergate have expressed perplexity over the amount of attention devoted to it in the press, and have suggested that the President's accusers in the press and in Congress have their own breaches of morality to worry about.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
HUNGARY

Of Moscow's orthodox East European allies, Prague and Budapest have provided the largest volume of comment on the impeachment developments. Prague has been foremost in sustaining the theme that the drive to remove the President from office has been engineered primarily by opponents of U.S.-Soviet detente. While Budapest has commented in the same vein, it has stressed at the same time that the Presidential crisis is symptomatic of a malaise of disenchantment allegedly afflicting the American political scene ever since the assassination of President Kennedy.

The Prague domestic service early on the 6th carried a report which cast the President in a favorable light in noting that he "wants to give voluntarily" all needed materials to the Senate, winding up with his expressed "firm conviction" that the overall Watergate episode does not warrant his removal from office. In contrast, the Budapest domestic service on the 6th remarked that President Nixon "has admitted that he not only knew about the Watergate affair but also helped in the coverup," adding that the 5 August statement was "an open admission of the charge that he had obstructed justice." Sustaining this tone, the radio said the President's "only hope" is that a minimum of 34 Senators would accept the view that removal from office "would be far too heavy a punishment for the offenses he himself had admitted."

Czechoslovak media recently have continued to portray the President as an important factor in the success of detente. Thus, Bratislava PRAVDA on 30 July carried a full-page transcript of an undated Moscow TV discussion praising this year's Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow. The next day the party daily RUDE PRAVO charged that Watergate and the President's "personal difficulties" had been misused by "the enemies of peaceful coexistence" in an attempt to "frustrate" the Moscow summit. At the same time there was hedging in the Prague agricultural daily ZEME'ELSKÉ NOVINY, which noted on the 1st that "the experts and many outstanding figures are agreed that there will be no change in the United States' more realistic approach" to foreign affairs if President Nixon left office in the current situation.

A similar observation, drawing a distinction between Mr. Nixon and the U.S. Presidency, appeared in a 6 August Budapest domestic TV commentary on the President's statement that he would not resign. Portraying the President as deserted by even his closest associates and in a "hopeless" situation, the commentary concluded with an assertion that "history does not depend on individuals." It added

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that the agreements concluded at the U.S.-Soviet summits "were signed by the President of the United States" and that "their validity is indisputable and hopes pinned on continuity are justified." The charge that the impeachment drive was motivated by opponents of detente had largely faded away recently in Budapest media, but did appear in a 30 July Budapest TV commentary, which charged that Watergate was being "inflated by party interests with narrow horizons on the one side, but last and not least also by concepts of foreign policy which oppose President Nixon's international policies." The commentary portrayed the Watergate burglary itself as only an "insignificant episode" in the long-standing disenchantment allegedly felt by Americans with their political system, starting with President Kennedy's assassination and extending through the Vietnam war and recent economic difficulties.

POLAND,
EAST GERMANY

Warsaw comment on the Watergate and impeachment developments has been sparse in volume and restrained in tone. A typical commentary by Berezowski in the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on 28 July wound up an explanation of the impeachment process with the observation that "the United States is on the eve of important domestic events, which do not exclude considerable psychological shocks." The commentary included a routine remark to the effect that "powerful political forces" opposed to President Nixon's foreign policies were behind the Watergate affair. On the 26th, an article in the same paper had commented in low-keyed terms that the full exploitation of the possibilities of detente "depends of course on the results of the debate now being held across the ocean."

East Berlin media have confined their coverage of the impeachment drive to regular news reports generally favorable in tone to President Nixon. Thus, a GDR domestic service report of the President's 5 August statement highlighted his insistence that he had pressed for investigation and punishment of the Watergate culprits and his expressed conviction that the case did not justify impeachment.

YUGOSLAVIA

Belgrade media have provided increasingly greater coverage of impeachment developments and of the possibility the President might be removed or retire from office. In the strongest prediction so far, TANJUG on 6 August responded to reports that the President would not resign despite his admission that he had withheld information on the Watergate cover-up by stating that "it now looks almost certain" that he will not finish his term.

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Numerous commentaries emphasized that the President's removal from office would have international "consequences" because of the U.S. "presence" throughout the world. Although the commentators refrained from elaborating, describing such consequences as being "difficult to perceive at this time," the clear implication was that removal of President Nixon would weaken a Presidency that is too powerful for the world as well as for the United States. BORBA on 30 July contended that "the country headed by Richard Nixon is too strong at present at numerous points in the world, too involved (in one way or another) in all sensitive and explosive areas" so that the "vibrations" resulting from the President's removal would be felt "all over the globe."

In the strongest attack on the U.S. political system, Milika Sundic in a 5 August Zagreb radio commentary discounted the effect of the President's possible impeachment, contending that "Nixon's stay or departure is not of itself a cause for concern." Sundic viewed the President as being denounced by people "no less sinful than himself" and "sacrificed" by American "society" "so as to preserve itself." He specifically pointed to "the all-powerful military and intelligence community . . . capable of setting off a war wherever and whenever it wants without being answerable to anyone." He also rejected the view that impeachment demonstrated the strength of the U.S. political system, seeing it as no more than a "merciless attempt to preserve this system."

ALBANIA While continuing to fling epithets like "hangman" at the President, Tirana media have viewed the latest impeachment developments not as a cleansing of the American political system but rather as merely a struggle between political forces within a corrupt society. The party daily ZERI I POPULLIT on 31 July, as reported by ATA, pointed out that whether the President was removed from office was irrelevant since the "U.S. monopoly bourgeoisie" controls both major political parties and if "one Nixon leaves, another comes." As late as 3 August BASHKIMI predicted that President Nixon would reach an agreement with the Democrats to avoid impeachment. Apparently unaware that the President would receive a pension if he resigned, BASHKIMI said the Democrats would agree to allow the President to finish his term in order to receive a pension because it would enable them to "find their Republican opponents befuddled and unsuccessful" in the November election.

ASIAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES Peking media have not acknowledged this week's Watergate developments, in line with its consistent policy of avoiding comment on the subject. Peking has never mentioned Watergate or the possibility of Presidential impeachment.

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Pyongyang, on the other hand, has broadcast its first commentary on Watergate. A domestic service broadcast on 29 July combined a relatively straightforward account of proceedings against the President with a highly colored interpretation of the meaning of the crisis. It said that events had driven the United States into "extreme political chaos" marked by a sharpened confrontation between the incumbent Republicans and the Democrats, the latter being motivated by a desire to "retaliate" for their defeat in 1968. It dismissed the importance of bugging and illegal fund raising as causes of the crisis, calling such practices "common" in the United States. The President's basic problem, it said, was that he had become isolated from the people as a result of his economic policies and his constant pursuit of a policy of war. The commentary also asserted that the President's practice of appointing "heinous" anticommunist elements to high posts also evoked popular opposition. The commentary did not speculate on how the situation might affect U.S. foreign policy.

Vietnamese communist media promptly reported this week's Watergate developments, just as other Watergate news detrimental to the President has been consistently publicized by Hanoi and PRG media since early 1973. A particularly detailed evaluation of the President's situation was offered to Vietnamese listeners in a 4 August Hanoi broadcast which explained recent developments in Washington and the constitutional process of impeachment. The commentary observed that the President's hope now was to avoid conviction by the Senate, and it likened him to a man "trapped in a house completely engulfed by fire." It noted without comment that Vice President Ford was "ready to replace" the President and was "fully cognizant of foreign policy matters." Typically denigrating all major political forces in the United States, the commentary maintained that the conflict over Watergate involved competing "capitalist forces" and concluded that:

The contradictions between the U.S. capitalists are more acute than ever before. These contradictions are destroying the capitalist regime right at its foundation and driving the U.S. society into a serious political, ideological, moral, and social crisis never seen before during the entire 200-year history of the United States.

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C Y P R U S

USSR REMAINS NONCOMMITTAL ON TURKISH ROLE, ISLAND'S FUTURE

Moscow's continued cautious and selective reportage and comment on the Cyprus problem and international diplomatic activity aimed at resolving it suggest that the USSR is endeavoring to keep its lines open to all parties, remain noncommittal for the present, and avoid taking any firm positions offensive to any side. In regard to the second stage of the Geneva conference on Cyprus, scheduled to reconvene on 8 August, Moscow on the 4th noted that Greece was still considering whether to attend, pending a return by Turkish forces on Cyprus to positions held on the day the cease-fire was signed. At the same time Moscow media apparently ignored Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit's statement on the 5th that Turkey would not go to Geneva unless all conditions of the Geneva Declaration were complied with. But TASS on the 6th reported that the Turkish National Security Council had examined Cyprus developments and Turkey's position at the forthcoming second stage of the Geneva talks.

Although the Soviet Union apparently has been touching base diplomatically with all sides, Moscow has not publicized its contacts, in keeping with its usual practice. Thus, Turkish media reported that Foreign Minister Gunes met in Geneva on the 31st with the Soviet foreign ministry official sent to monitor the Geneva talks, and that Gunes later received the Soviet ambassador to Turkey in Ankara on the 5th. Nicosia radio on the 3d reported that Kliridhis had met the previous day with the Soviet ambassador to Cyprus, while Athens radio said that the Soviet ambassador had called on Foreign Minister Mavros on the 5th. Monitored Soviet media have apparently not mentioned the talks held in Ankara, Nicosia, and Athens by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Hartman.

SECURITY COUNCIL,
GENEVA DECLARATION

The Geneva Declaration, signed by Greece, Turkey and Britain on the 31st, came in for criticism by Soviet UN delegate Malik in his elaborate "explanation" of the USSR veto of a Security Council resolution on the 31st and its abstention on a similar resolution adopted the following day. The resolution in effect expanded the functions of the UN Peace-keeping Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP) to enable it to perform duties envisioned in the Geneva Declaration. TASS on the 2d said the Soviet delegation pointed out that the Geneva talks were held without the participation of representatives

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of the "legitimate government" of Cyprus. Soviet media thus far have made no mention of the expressed intention of Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders Kliridhis and Denktas to attend the second stage of the Geneva talks this week.

In a longer version of Malik's explanation of the Soviet abstention in the council, Moscow's domestic service on the 2d said that a majority of the provisions in the Geneva Declaration did not meet the basic demands of Security Council Resolution 353, in that most provisions were directed toward "delaying a political settlement" and continuing the occupation of Cyprus by foreign troops. Moscow cited as examples the "so-called demarcation of areas occupied by these troops," the establishment of "so-called security zones" to be patrolled by UNFICYP, and the provision to "postpone indefinitely" a resolution of the question of restoring constitutional government on Cyprus. In the weekly international observers' roundtable broadcast by Moscow's domestic service on the 4th, panelist Mikhaylov noted that reaction to the Geneva Declaration had been varied and that it was regarded as only a "first step" toward elimination of the crisis even by the signatories themselves. Mikhaylov cited British Foreign Secretary Callaghan as "admitting" in the House of Commons that the declaration could not be called a perfect document and that Cyprus could not prosper while it remained an armed camp.

TROOP ISSUE Other than to demand the removal of Greek officers of the Cyprus National Guard, Moscow has continued to be vague about the "foreign troops" required to withdraw. A broadcast of the Turkish-language communist clandestine "Our Radio" on 1 August, however, claimed that the Ecevit government had been "pushed into the Cyprus snare by imperialism" and urged the withdrawal of both Turkish and Greek troops from the mainland. Another "Our Radio" broadcast on the 6th supported the landing of "our troops" because it thwarted NATO plans to convert the island into a military base through enosis and contributed to the "liberation struggle of the Greek and Cypriot peoples." But it disapproved of a continuing Greek-Turkish troop presence on the island, charging that according to a "U.S. imperialist plan" to partition Cyprus, both Greek and Turkish troops must stay on the island, and it warned that this "intrigue" should not be allowed to succeed.

Moscow's reports on the situation in Cyprus have noted even-handedly that "irreconcilable" positions by the Greek and Turkish sides have prevented agreement on demarcation of the cease-fire lines and buffer zones. TASS on 6 August said that an "interim agreement" had been reached but on the 7th it reported that the military situation had

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"somewhat worsened," that Turkish troops had occupied a Greek village in the Kyrenia area, and that the military representatives at a new meeting had again failed to reach agreement on a demarcation line. TASS dispatches have cited without comment UN reports of Turkish troops advances since the cease-fire and noted that both Ankara and Athens have accused each other of violations.

FUTURE STATUS
OF CYPRUS

Soviet reportage has largely evaded the contentious issues in the question of the future structure of the Cyprus state. TASS on 1 August did report straightforwardly Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas' remarks that the Turkish side would insist on the establishment of a federal republic, with a federal government and "autonomous administrative organs" for the Turkish and Greek communities. TASS cited Denktas as saying that the "only new thing" in the Turkish position was that it now insisted on "an independent 'geographic base' which he called a 'Turkish canton.'" According to TASS, Denktas in reply to questions by correspondents said that "if the Turkish and Greek Cypriots want Makarios to be their president, the Turkish side has nothing against this." However, in speaking to journalists in Ankara on the 3d, Denktas was cited by AFP as declaring that the Turkish Cypriots were "totally opposed" to Makarios' return to the island.

Some Moscow comment has echoed the 28 July Soviet Government statement in accusing "certain NATO circles" of plans to partition Cyprus or create conditions for this. A Pugachov article in the weekly MOSCOW NEWS, reported by TASS on the 31st, charged that "NATO and imperialist elements" dreamed of enosis or partition of the island and complained that the "landing of NATO servicemen" was continuing. Introducing an old formula, not employed thus far in the current Cyprus crisis, Pugachov declared that the Soviet Union "cannot remain aloof from the Cyprus drama" and pledged that the Soviet people were prepared to give the Cypriot people "the most effective assistance and support." This affirmation of "assistance" has not been repeated in other Soviet comment on Cyprus.

On the matter of the Greek Cypriot leadership, Moscow has not been pressing for Makarios' return as president, nor has it endorsed "acting" President Kliridhis. In the only recent replay of remarks by Makarios, TASS on the 5th reported that in an interview with the Beirut AL-ANWAR Makarios criticized U.S. policy with respect to Cyprus and said he was not interested in "explanations" given by Secretary Kissinger regarding his future because this was a matter for the Cypriot people to decide. Reports that ministers of the

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short-lived Sampson government had resigned were noted by TASS on the 7th, which said that Kliridhis was holding consultations to form a new cabinet. Moscow had earlier indicated its disapproval of retention of the Sampson ministers in charging that the "rebels" still held power in Nicosia. TASS on the 4th had reported without comment that Kliridhis was in Athens for talks with the Greek leaders while Denktas had arrived in Ankara for talks.

SITUATION IN GREECE Soviet press comment on Greece in the past week has seemed more concerned to press for legalization of the Greek left than to analyze Athens' role in the complex problem of Cyprus' future. PRAVDA's international review on the 4th did remark that a relaxation of tensions in the eastern Mediterranean would depend in many ways on the policy adopted by the new Greek Government, and it added that judging by the first statements of the Karamanlis regime, Athens supported Security Council Resolution 353, recognized "President Makarios of Cyprus," and would recall Greek officers from the island. But a series of articles in the central press, along with some radio comment, has focused largely on Greece's "short first step" toward restoration of democracy while adopting a wait-and-see attitude pending clarification of the government's position toward Greek "progressive forces."

Typifying the comment, a Menshikov article in PRAVDA, as reported by TASS on the 3d, asserted that the "Cyprus adventure" did not cause the fall of the Greek junta but simply accelerated the internal breakup of the "reactionary military dictatorship." Menshikov observed that the new Karamanlis government had promised parliamentary elections in the next six months and legalization of the activities of all political parties, including the leftwing EDA and the communist party, the KKE. But Menshikov, like other Moscow commentators, voiced reservations, calling it unrealistic to underestimate the danger of a "possible reactionary counterattack" and cautioning that "certain NATO circles" still backed "Greek militarism." Kornilov in VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, reported by TASS on the 5th, warned of other Greek enemies, including "big capital, both Greek and foreign," as well as the junta itself.

Articles by Shmarov in IZVESTIYA and Menshikov again in PRAVDA on the 6th publicized statements by the KKE. Shmarov cited a resolution calling for a purge from the government of all supporters of the military regime, abrogation of antidemocratic laws, elections for a constituent assembly, and the formulation of an independent foreign policy. Menshikov called attention to the "wide response

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR GRANTS ENHANCED STATURE TO PLO, WITHHOLDS FULL SUPPORT

During the 30 July-3 August visit to the Soviet Union by a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Moscow significantly expanded its public support of the PLO but refrained from extending the official recognition the PLO has long sought as "sole legitimate representative" of all Palestinians. In avoiding this particular sign of formal commitment to the PLO, Moscow suggested that it continues to be concerned over the persistent disunity and fractiousness among the various fedayeen groups within the PLO.* This concern is probably particularly acute at a time when Moscow is urging PLO participation in the Geneva peace conference and advocating that the PLO enjoy equal rights with the other participants. Moscow's caution in dealing with Palestinian matters probably also reflects a desire to maintain flexibility in its position on a future peace settlement and in its relations with various Arab states.

PLO OFFICE,
RECOGNITION Although Moscow proved reluctant to accord the PLO official recognition, it nevertheless went several steps beyond its previous public position on the PLO cause. The most significant of these steps, announced in a joint communique carried by TASS on 3 August, was to grant the PLO permission to open a "representation" in Moscow. The communique did not further specify the purpose of the proposed PLO office, stating only that Soviet consent had been granted in response to a PLO "request."

A second major step taken by Moscow to increase its public support for the PLO was its willingness in the joint communique to note "with satisfaction the importance of the decisions" at the November 1973 Arab summit conference in Algiers and the February 1974 Moslem conference in Lahore concerning "recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine." Although subject to interpretation as indirect or "de facto" Soviet recognition, this measure nonetheless fell short of meeting the frequently expressed PLO desire for explicit official recognition. Moscow domestic

* For a recent indication of this concern, see the TRENDS of 10 July 1974, pp. 12-13.

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service on the 5th and PRAVDA on the 6th seemed to point up acknowledgment of this discrepancy by publicizing a statement by the head of the PLO delegation, Fatah leader and PLO Executive Committee chairman Yasir 'Arafat. In a statement to Soviet newsmen reported by TASS on 3 August, 'Arafat asserted that the PLO's international prestige had increased and noted in this context that the PLO had been considered at the Arab and Moslem conferences to be the sole representative of the Palestinians. In the same context 'Arafat expressed appreciation for Soviet and other socialist states' support, without mentioning the issue of PLO recognition.

GENEVA
REPRESENTATION

The communique also expressed the Soviet Union's support for PLO participation in the Geneva conference "on an equal footing with other delegations" so that the PLO could "present its program" to settle the Palestinian issue within the framework of international efforts to resolve the Middle East problem. This represents a more explicit call for a separate Palestinian delegation, rather than Palestinian representation within Jordan's delegation, than Moscow had previously expressed. But the intent seemed clear in the 24 January Soviet-Egyptian communique on Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit to the USSR, which had stated that the Palestinian problem could not be considered and resolved without representatives of the Palestinians, and "the sides declared for equal participation of these representatives" in the work of the Geneva conference.

TREATMENT
OF VISIT

Moscow's handling of the visit seemed designed to satisfy at least partially PLO desires for an enhanced status, while at the same time avoiding too close an identification with it. Along with the permission for a PLO office and indirect recognition of the PLO as the only representative of the Palestinians, other aspects of the visit also departed from past Moscow treatment of Palestinian delegations and indicated generally increased support. Previously, 'Arafat's contacts--publicly, at least--had been confined to meetings with the host organization, the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and "other USSR public organizations," and uninformative communiques had been issued by the solidarity committee. For the present visit, the communique on the 31 July meeting with Ponomarev marked an elevation in status, as did the statement in the communique that 'Arafat had been received by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. However, Moscow provided no further information on the Kuznetsov meeting.

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On the other hand, Moscow seemed at pains to circumscribe the scope of the visit: Despite Palestinian claims that 'Arafat had been invited on an official visit by Brezhnev, Soviet reportage avoided any characterization of the visit and failed to specify the source of the invitation. And while the PLO delegation was honored at a dinner attended by Ponomarev, who "exchanged toasts" with 'Arafat, the dinner was given by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The visit did not generate much publicity, although Moscow did extend the courtesy of allowing the delegation to meet with Soviet journalists on the 2d, as reported by TASS the following day. Following past practice, Moscow's Arabic-language service, in a broadcast on the 5th after the delegation's departure, carried a recorded statement made by 'Arafat during his meeting with correspondents of Soviet press, radio and television--presumably the meeting with media representatives on the 2d.

TOLKUNOV Coinciding with the 'Arafat delegation's arrival
ON DISUNITY in Moscow, IZVESTIYA on 30 July published a major
 article on general Palestinian matters which
clearly indicated that disunity within the PLO continues to be a
source of frustration for Moscow. The article, second in a
series on the Middle East by chief editor Lev Tolkunov, was
the most extensive examination of the Palestinian question in
the central press since a PRAVDA article by Pavel Demchenko on
29 August 1972. Covering much of the same ground and making
many of the same points that Demchenko had, Tolkunov's principal
message was that differences within the Palestinian movement had
weakened it and that all PLO members should unite behind a common
program. While asserting that "realistic trends" were now pre-
vailing in the Palestinian movement, Tolkunov cautioned that
there were also "reactionaries and extremists" and those who
"do not know how to choose the correct tactics." Tolkunov gave
clear expression to Soviet impatience with some of the PLO groups,
characterizing the Palestinians' primary difficulties as the need
for unity, for clearly defined goals, and for intensified
cooperation with the Soviet Union.

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In contrast to RED STAR, Zhilin argued that the answer to continuing opposition to detente should be sought as much in the political and diplomatic spheres as in continuing military preparations. The distinction was underscored by the contrasting selection of quotations from Brezhnev's Warsaw speech in the RED STAR and PRAVDA articles. The ominous sounding quotation selected by RED STAR was actually inconsistent with the main thrust of Brezhnev's remarks which were directed against the "dangerous" notion that peace could be insured by increasing military preparedness. Zhilin was more faithful to Brezhnev's intent in selecting another passage: "if you want peace you must pursue a policy of peace and fight for that policy."*

SOVIET STRATEGIST HAILS SUMMIT, CALLS FOR "MILITARY DETENTE"

The prospect of a "further development and deepening" of detente is foreseen by prominent Soviet military theorist Colonel V. V. Larionov in a major article on East-West relations published in the 18 July issue of RED STAR. Addressed ostensibly to defending the Soviet stand at the East-West talks on arms limitation in Europe, the article in fact argued the case for a whole range of assumptions and calculations which the Soviets lump under the heading of peaceful coexistence. Although Larionov is too much of a professional strategist to be easily categorized as a "hawk" or a "dove," the views expressed in this article clearly tend toward the "dove" side of the Soviet political spectrum.

The argument is based on a highly positive assessment of the current trend in East-West relations. Prominent among the factors which have brought about this situation, said Larionov, is a change in the perceptions of Western leaders. Realistic Western leaders have "become convinced," he said, that the military road to the pursuit of their goals no longer offered the promise of success. While conceding that the forces of reaction in the West remain strong, he noted that today "not a single capitalist state" openly opposes detente.

* Brezhnev's Warsaw speech and his position on arms control are discussed in the TRENDS of 24 July 1974, pages 10-12.

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Against this background, Larionov proposed further "constructive, practical measures in the sphere of military detente." Referring apparently to the standing Soviet proposals on arms control, he marshalled a long list of arguments testifying to the commitment of the Soviet Union to international security and to the compatibility of its policies with the principle of "equal security." In a striking acknowledgment of the mutuality of Soviet and Western interests in reliable arms control arrangements, he referred to the "recognition by leading political figures in the West of the fact that the concept of security based on superiority is meaningless in the nuclear age."

In promoting the idea of "supplementing political detente with military detente," Larionov has reverted to a formula used by Brezhnev, Gromyko and others over the past year. It was included in the communique issued at the conclusion of Brezhnev's visit to the United States last year, and has been used by Brezhnev in several of his speeches. He mentioned it in his speech in honor of a visiting DRV delegation on 10 July 1973, and again in his speech in Alma Ata on 15 August 1973.

RECRIMINATIONS CONTINUE OVER BERLIN TRANSIT DISPUTE

The FRG and GDR have failed to resolve the dispute over West Berlin transit rights in a special Transit Commission session held on 6 August. The conflict, focused originally on the FRG Environmental Office in West Berlin, has since expanded into a confrontation over the legality of the GDR's retaliatory transit ban against FEO staff, property and documents in the light of the Berlin Transit Agreement. At the same time Pankow has sought to turn the tables on Bonn by trumpeting the arrest and sentencing of West Germans and West Berliners for smuggling out GDR citizens, thereby implying FRG Government responsibility for violations of the Transit Agreement.

GDR-SOVIET COORDINATION Since the GDR government's official statement of 20 July, in which the transit of all FEO staff, property and documents through the GDR was declared "unlawful", the Soviet and East German media have exhibited close coordination. Both governments first confirmed the establishment of GDR checking procedures on 31 July, a full 5 days after the first Autobahn incidents. In a restrained and legalistic tone, they continued to stress that the transit "checks" were being directed solely against the FRG Environmental Office. The GDR measures "have in no way affected the normal transit traffic to and from West Berlin,"

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claimed a Soviet broadcast on 3 August, and the two governments denied vehemently that the checks could be considered a violation of the Transit Agreement. Neither country mentioned that one Environmental Office official, Norbert von Neidrig, was actually identified and denied transit on 29 July, nor the BILD AM SONNTAG's revelation that an East German spy had disclosed the names of all FEO personnel to the GDR Government.

**GDR CHARGES
AGAINST BONN**

The GDR Government complemented its attack on the FRG Environmental Office with almost daily reports of the arrest and sentencing of West Germans and West Berliners for smuggling out GDR citizens. In stereotyped announcements the GDR charged the accused with "antistate trafficking in human beings" and "abusing the transit agreement." Sentences characteristically ranged between four and eight years imprisonment. There was a conspicuous absence of dates for most of the arrests and sentencings, although some arrests were reported by GDR media to have occurred as far back as 20 April, suggesting that the government withheld announcements for this occasion. Implicit in the GDR campaign was the charge that the FRG Government permitted these violations and was therefore responsible for them.

Soviet media were silent on the GDR campaign until 26 July, when TASS cited an ADN report condemning "these fresh and serious attempts at sabotaging transit traffic" and calling on the FRG Government and West Berlin Senate to "strictly observe their contractual obligations" to the Transit Agreement. In its only other comment on the arrests, TASS again cited an ADN report on the abortive Transit Commission meeting of 6 August, denouncing the "trafficking organizations from the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin" and demanding that Bonn take "corrective measures" against the violators.

**COVERAGE OF
NEGOTIATIONS**

Soviet and East German media have allotted only scant coverage to diplomatic negotiations surrounding the transit dispute. Neither country mentioned the talks between West German State Secretary Guenter Gaus and GDR Foreign Ministry official Karl Seidel on 2 August. Likewise, neither government mentioned the FRG's repeated requests for a special Transit Commission session until after the meeting finally convened on 6 August. The FRG proposal to raise bilateral talks to a higher level was ignored by the two media, as were the Western powers' official protest notes tendered to Moscow on 5 August.

While both communist countries have held the FRG Government responsible for the Berlin developments, the Soviet Union has sought to soften its stand by implying that the blame rests with "rightist" circles. The

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Soviets have also stressed the overriding theme of detente, with one commentator stating a wish to avoid endangering the CSCE. Meanwhile, the GDR noted a "temporary delay" in the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, an incident ignored thus far by Moscow.

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SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS

NO INDICATIONS YET OF TRADITIONAL CRIMEAN MEETING

Soviet bloc media have given no indications thus far that the customary multilateral Crimea meeting of Soviet and East European party leaders, held at this juncture each summer since 1971, has been held this year. Soviet bloc comment in the wake of last year's Crimea gathering, held in the usual time frame of 30-31 July, had stressed that these multilateral meetings had now become "a tradition." Brezhnev met separately in the Crimea with Husak on 1 August and Kadar on the 5th. Warsaw's PAP on the 6th also reported a meeting in the Crimea between Husak and Poland's Gierek, who had arrived in the USSR for "a rest" on the 29th. Kadar in the meantime, had returned home on the 5th, according to Radio Moscow and MTI. While the whereabouts of the GDR's Honecker were not publicly accounted for, Romania's Ceausescu and Bulgaria's Zhivkov were reported in their home countries on 30 July and 1 August, respectively.

Possible explanations for the apparent delay or cancellation of this year's Crimea gathering could include the obstreperousness of Ceausescu, who had reportedly reasserted Bucharest's independent stance at the Warsaw Pact summit meeting held in the Polish capital in April. In the communique issued after the Crimea gathering last year, Ceausescu had uncharacteristically joined in endorsing "coordination" of foreign policy as well as Brezhnev's "personal" contribution to detente.

Possibly anticipating a public comment by Peking on the lack of a Crimea gathering this year, a Shalygin commentary broadcast by Moscow radio on the 6th denounced "bourgeois" and "Maoist" speculation regarding relations among the socialist countries. These opponents, it charged, exploit "a few guesses" to assert that Soviet bloc cooperation is not based on equality and that "some parties are subjected to others." The commentary added that such formerly backward countries as Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania never in the past had "as much independence and real sovereignty as they enjoy at present."

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VIETNAM

DRV, PRG REBUKE U.S. STAND ON AID TO GVN, MISSING PERSONNEL

Hanoi and PRG media have assailed U.S. policies in new foreign ministry statements condemning U.S. aid to the GVN and commentaries on Washington demands for an accounting on American personnel missing in action. The foreign ministry statements--from the PRG on 1 August and the DRV on the 2d--voiced standard criticisms of U.S. aid to South Vietnam without any increase in invective or new warnings. The statements followed a number of commentaries on the 23 July joint Senate-House conference agreement on aid for the GVN, but they were not specifically pegged to Congressional action on the aid proposal.

Both statements noted Secretary of State Kissinger's role in promoting the aid appropriations, and the PRG statement recalled his early June testimony before U.S. Congressional committees considering the bill when he "admitted" that foreign aid was "to support U.S. vital interests" and not so the recipients could "enjoy the aid." This same testimony by the Secretary had drawn a scornfully worded 11 June NHAN DAN "Commentator" article charging U.S. failure to "withdraw all military personnel disguised as civilians" and its refusal to implement Article 21 of the Paris agreement--the article setting forth U.S. intention to provide aid for DRV reconstruction.* While the DRV statement made passing reference to "tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel disguised as civilians" in the South, this issue was ignored in the PRG statement, and neither statement cited Article 21.

U.S. obligations under Article 21 were recalled in a 3 August Hanoi Vietnamese-language radio commentary--summarized by VNA--on missing U.S. personnel in Vietnam which pointedly reminded the United States of its "pledge to contribute to the healing of war wounds" in the DRV and complained that the United States "only wants to implement those provisions of the Paris agreement that are advantageous to it." The commentary charged that U.S. authorities are engaged in a "campaign of slander" to shift responsibility to the DRV for failure to implement Article 8-B of the Paris agreement which spelled out the principle of mutual

* This Commentator article is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 June 1974, pages 16-18.

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assistance in the search for missing personnel. The commentary took great pains to defend the DRV's "long-standing humanitarian policy" with regard to POW's and those missing in action. A Hanoi broadcast in Mandarin on the same day specifically deplored a "slandorous TV statement" on 31 July by U.S. Defense Department and State Department officials on the issue of the missing in action.

A 4 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary accused the United States of using the missing U.S. servicemen issue to "distract the attention" of the American public. It offered a twofold justification for Article 8-B not being carried out at the present time, claiming that GVN attacks had undermined work on the missing in action in South Vietnam and asserting that the implementation of Article 8-B "means that all other articles of the agreement must be strictly and seriously observed."

PROMOTIONS, POSITIONS OF NORTH VIETNAM'S GENERALS NOTED

Hanoi media in the past three months have revealed numerous changes in the command of the North Vietnamese armed forces (VPA). On 27 April Hanoi reported that the DRV Government had granted a number of promotions in the highest ranks of the VPA--the first such promotions known to have been made in 13 years--but no list of the new military rankings was released.* Among the first promotions to be disclosed were the identification, for the first time, of VPA Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung as a senior general and Political General Department Chief Song Hao as a colonel general. Dung's promotion made him the first general to share the highest rank in the army with Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap since the death of Senior General Nguyen Chi Thanh in July 1967.

Dung had already taken over most of Giap's traditional public functions since July 1973, when the defense minister stopped appearing regularly in public. Giap reappeared in Hanoi at this year's May Day celebrations--after an absence of almost seven months--and took part in other public activities that month; however, he again dropped out of sight after an appearance at a 28 May banquet for the visiting Cambodian Front defense minister. More recently, Dung failed to make an expected public appearance at the 31 July reception given by the PRC military attache to mark Chinese Army Day.

* For a discussion of the original report on the promotions, see the TRENDS of 1 May 1974, pages 2-3.

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Dung had attended the reception in 1973 and Giap had attended it every previous year since 1965. Hanoi's last known reference to Dung's activities was a report on 15 July that he had "recently" visited a military hospital on the occasion of the forthcoming 27 July Wounded and Fallen War Heroes Day.

LIEUTENANT GENERALS

Four new lieutenant generals have been noted in Hanoi media since April, and it is likely there are others who have not appeared in public in the intervening weeks and, therefore, have not yet been identified. Two of the new lieutenant generals--Nguyen Don and Tran Quy Hai--had particularly obvious qualifications for their promotions. Both were already alternate members of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Central Committee, vice ministers of defense, deputy chiefs of staff, and members of the Central Military Party Committee. Articles by Hai in the army's monthly journal TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN seemed to indicate that he had a major role in evaluating and drawing lessons from the communists' 1972 offensive. In an article in the May 1973 issue of the journal Hai pointed out the need to review the experience of the previous year's offensive; in the following months the journal provided such a review in a comprehensive series of articles on military campaigns. Hai contributed to the series himself in the October issue of the journal, with an article on staff tasks in an offensive campaign.

The other two new lieutenant generals are Le Quang Hao, deputy chief of the Political General Department and head of the DRV's delegation to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, and Pham Kiet, vice minister of public security and command and political officer of the People's Armed Security Forces. Neither of these officers has been identified as a member or alternate member of the VWP Central Committee.

There are other VPA major generals who would seem likely candidates for the rank of lieutenant general but whose status cannot be determined, since their activities have not been reported by Hanoi since the 27 April promotion announcement. High on the list is Le Quang Dao, a deputy chief of the Political General Department who was raised from alternate to full membership in the VWP Central committee at least as far back as March 1973. In addition to these posts, conflicting citations in Hanoi media in February and April this year indicated that Dao had been elevated from regular membership on the Central Military Party Committee to be either a standing member or a deputy secretary. Dao has been a prominent military spokesman, most recently authoring an article in the March 1974 TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on modernization of the armed forces and earlier publishing an article on ideology in the December issue of the journal.

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The status of many North Vietnamese generals who might warrant the rank of Lieutenant general cannot be judged from the media since they have not appeared in North Vietnam for several years. One such general--Tran Van Quang--did make a single appearance in Hanoi earlier this year after being given no known attention in the media since 1966. The 26 January issue of the paper HANOI MOI noted that Quang had visited some factories and offices in the capital and for the first time identified him as a member of the VWP Central Committee. The paper also noted that he was a member of the Central Military Party Committee, vice minister of defense, and deputy chief of staff.

MAJOR GENERALS At least eight promotions from senior colonel to major general have been disclosed in communist media since April. Most recently Peking, but not Hanoi, carried a report on a meeting of the North Vietnamese air defense-air force command to mark Chinese Army Day which for the first time identified the political officer of the command, Hoang Phuong, as a major general--a position confirmed by QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 5 August when it published an interview with him. The air defense commander, Le Van Tri, had earlier been designated as a major general in a Hanoi report in late April, and his position was confirmed in the Chinese account of the recent anniversary meeting.

Peking also provided fuller reports than Hanoi on the PRC military attache's reception in the North Vietnamese capital, listing several generals who attended while VNA only noted the presence of Lieutenant General Tran Quy Hai. One of the major generals said by NCNA to have been present, Luong Nhan, had not previously been identified in that position. Luong Nhan, a deputy chief of the VPA General Department of Rear Services, was among the several contributors to the series of articles on military campaigns in the 1973 issues of TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, writing on the rear service's functions in an offensive campaign in the July 1973 journal.

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NORTH VIETNAMESE GENERALS

Senior Generals

Vo Nguyen Giap
* Van Tien Dung

Colonel Generals

* Song Hao
Chu Van Tan

Lieutenant Generals

* Nguyen Don
* Tran Quy Hai
* Le Quang Hoa
* Pham Kiet

Hoang Van Thai
Tran Van Tra
Nguyen Van Vinh

Major Generals

Le Quang Ba
Nguyen Thang Binh
* Vu Van Can
Le Quang Dao
Tran Do
Bang Gieng
To Ky
Tran Luong
Le Hien Mai
Chu Huy Man
Pham Ngoc Mau
Tran Dai Nghia
* Luong Nhan
* Hoang Phuong

Tran Van Quang
* Nguyen Quyet
Tran Sam
* Phung The Tai
Le Trong Tan
Hoang Minh Thao
Dinh Duc Thien
* Huynh Thu
* Le Van Tri
* Doan Tue
Phan Trong Tue
Hoang Anh Tuan
Nguyen Trong Vinh
Vuong Thua Vu

* Promoted to this rank in 1974.

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CHINA

LEADERSHIP UNITY, SURFACING OF YANG CHENG-WU MARK ARMY DAY

In keeping with recent PRC media indications that the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius is being toned down in favor of greater emphasis on unity, Peking's celebration of Army Day this year was highlighted by the largest display of leadership unity in the past three months. The convalescing Chou En-lai headed the turnout of almost all Politburo members usually in Peking for the annual anniversary eve reception on 31 July, Chou's first such appearance since late last May. Army Day celebrations last year drew only a modest leadership turnout, with Chou, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan failing to put in an appearance. The heavy turnout this year appears aimed at reaffirming Chou's continued leadership role as well as demonstrating leadership unity.

For the second year in a row Army Day did not trigger a central newspaper editorial. Peking newspapers frontpaged a portrait of Mao and printed selected quotations from his works stressing the party's leadership role over all areas of Chinese society. The 1972 PLA anniversary occasioned a joint editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY as well as a turnout of all active Peking-based Politburo members to demonstrate a return to normal party-army relations after the Lin Piao affair.

The image of a united leadership, at a time when industrial and agricultural production appears to be suffering due to disruptions spurred by the current political campaign, was sharpened by the reappearance at the anniversary eve reception of former PLA acting Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu and other casualties of the cultural revolution. Yang was listed among those "also present" without any indication of his current duties. NCNA grouped Yang with other purged military leaders in such a fashion as to emphasize the need for unity among formerly opposed factions, so long as they opposed Lin Piao. Yang headed the group, followed by former Deputy Chief of Staff Chang Ai-ping and former General Staff Operations Director Wang Shang-jung, both of whom were purged in 1966 after Yang became acting Chief of Staff. In announcing Yang's purge on 24 March 1968, Lin had linked the three men, declaring that though Chang and Wang opposed Yang, they were nonetheless guilty, being members of Ho Lung's clique, and could still be criticized. The current NCNA ranking seems designed to recall Lin's denunciation and demonstrate unity between the formerly opposed leaders.

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The reasons for Yang's fall in 1968 were not clear, though he was accused of enmity to Chiang Ching and was said to have collected material unfavorable to both Chiang and Chou En-lai. Speeches by some of the central leadership following the purge charged Yang with a number of standard crimes, but the most serious charges seemed to involve misuse of the armed forces by forming his own clique and promoting his own followers, thus offending not only Chiang Ching but a number of other military leaders, including the powerful military region chiefs.

The machinations which engineered Yang's rehabilitation may have also played a role in the rotation at the end of 1973 of all China's military region commanders who were also provincial party chiefs. Of the eight commanders transferred, three--Li Te-sheng, Han Hsien-chu, and Ting Sheng--failed to appear for Army Day celebrations this year. All are known to have been under heavy poster attack during the current campaign.

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NOTES

PRC-CAMBODIAN FRONT RELATIONS: A message on the 1 August PRC Army Day from Cambodian insurgent Defense Minister Khieu Samphan underlined the marked improvement in his relations with Peking since his extended stay in China during a tour abroad this spring. The message, carried by AKI on 4 August, contrasted sharply with the brief, perfunctory greetings that have marked the occasion in the past. It gave special praise to Mao, "the eminent and beloved leader of the Chinese people," lauded Chinese policy as "the brilliant proletarian revolutionary line of Chairman Mao Tse-tung," and hailed China's "pure proletarian internationalist spirit" in providing "a stable and secure rear of the Cambodian people." The defense minister expressed particular thanks for the "multiform aid, both moral and material," which he said the PLA "has not ceased to grant us," and said that his reception while touring China this spring has testified to the "unbreakable bonds of militant solidarity and fraternal friendship" between the PLA and the Front armed forces.

TONKIN GULF ANNIVERSARY: DRV media, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Tonkin Gulf incident, offered standard praise for the "heroic" role played by the DRV armed forces in defending against U.S. air strikes and pointed out the need for maintaining "regular and all-out" preparations "well before war breaks out." While given prominent press attention, with editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and a TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, the decennial anniversary was not marked with a meeting such as was held on the fifth anniversary in 1969. The event had already been given diminished attention last year, when for the first time it did not prompt editorials in the leading Hanoi papers.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 29 JULY - 4 AUGUST 1974

Moscow (2359 items)

China	(5%)	7%
Cyprus Crisis	(8%)	6%
RSFSR Supreme	(---)	5%
Soviet Session		
Chile	(2%)	3%

Peking (871 items)

Criticism of Lin Piao and	(9%)	9%
Confucius		
PLA 47th Anniversary	(--)	9%
Law of the Sea Conference	(20%)	8%
Cyprus Crisis	(5%)	7%
Indochina	(3%)	5%
[DRV Vice Premier Le	(--)	3%]
Thanh Nghi in PRC		
European Security	(1%)	3%
Conference		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.